Across legal and economic disciplines, there have been many arguments regarding the benefits of free trade on developing countries. At the heart of such discussion is the controversial result of the Washington Consensus “describe[ed] a set of ten specific economic policy prescriptions that … constitute a "standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington D.C based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department.” (Wikipedia). According to Dani Rodrik (2006) the ten commandments of Washington consensus were:
1. Fiscal discipline
2. Reorientation of public expenditures
3. Tax reform
4. Financial liberalization
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates
6. Trade liberalization
7. Openness to FDI
8. Privatization
9. Deregulation
10.Secure Property Rights
In an assessment of the literature on the theory and empirical research relating to the benefits of trade liberalization, Deraniyagala and Fine (2001) found that much of the works were flawed, and concluded that the extent to which free trade benefits economic development is unknown. As the result, the past three decades since 1980s found many political economists arguing for a better approach toward trade liberalization in order to minimize its negative impacts of economic backwardness as in the case of Latin American or income distribution and regional polarization as the case of China.
Mexico is an example of a failed economy that followed the conventional wisdom of trade liberalization rigidly. Here, we find that more than one lesson could be learned. The country started its economic reform in 1985. Under tremendous pressure from the U.S. and the IMF, Mexico radically opened up its economy to the world market without sufficient institutional reform to accommodate the economic adjustment. “Import penetration increase from an average of 11.3 percent in 1080-85 to 14.5 in 1986-90. By 1990, import penetration had already reached 17 percent.” (Dornbusch, 1992). The sharp rise in imports, which was not accompanied by immediate gain in exports and foreign direct investments damaged Mexico’s domestic market and defy many infant industries. (Dornbusch, 1992). It is argued that Mexico, as well as Latin America as a whole, did worse than its pre-1980s period, when import substitution, protectionism and macroeconomics populism were enforced. (Rodrik 2007). As Rodrik asserts: “That the region did better with these discredited policies than it has been under open-market policies is a fact that is quite hard to digest within the conventional paradigm.” Such paradox reinforces the importance of a new approach to trade liberalization where country’s institutional and historical background are all too significant to be ignored and total trade liberalization alone may not generate the growth that its creator promised. Here, the role of the government and some forms of targeted protectionism at the beginning of the reform may be useful. South Korea and China offered excellent case studies for its usage of the new trade theory to their economic benefits.
Korea did not play by the orthodox wisdom (nor it has ever accepted the Washington Consensus to be therapeutic during the Asian crisis) when it started to integrate into the world economy. In contrast, the country successful economic reform involves two major key strategies- market orientation coupled with central planning in developing and protecting infant industries while strategically opened up other industries to the world market. During the reform, Korean government, indeed, acted as an entrepreneur to induce desirable private investments toward targeted industries. Korean trade liberalization, therefore, was a selective process instead of being driven solely by global marketization. Many major sectors were deliberately protected and excluded from trade. By using selective export strategy and heavy government intervention, Korea was able to develop many highly competitive manufacturing industries such as automobile, electrical appliances and shipping which respectively hold their own names in the world market.
China started its reform by first rejecting the conventional wisdom of global liberalization and calling its reform “Socialism with Chinese Characteristic.” Unlike Latin America, Chinese government moved cautiously from central planning to gradual adoption of institutional and mechanism of market economy. Rodrik (2004) argues that China reformed its incentives in a “two-track manner” by grafting a market system on top of a central-planned system, rather than abandoning the latter altogether. The country also underplayed private property rights and relied instead on township-and-village enterprises owned by local governments as well as opened up to the world partially by establishing special economic zones. (Rodrik, 2004). Without following the Washington consensus blindly, the result of Chinese economic progress has been impressive. China’s GDP performance has been consistently stayed at 8-10% growth rate in the past 20 years. Here, China’s success challenged the conventional wisdom total trade liberalization and market orientation.
Despite how countries have been benefiting from trade, there exist multiple issues created by export growth strategy itself such as income inequality and regional polarization. According to Ocampo and Taylor (1998), globalization has intensified the income gap and income distribution especially in countries with comparative advantage in skill-intensive products. The authors offer examples of African economies whose comparative advantage in peasant production has worsened income distribution. Similarly, despite China’s conservative approach toward trade liberalization in accordance with government intervention, the country has been facing serious issues regarding income inequality and regional polarization. Prior to the eruption of the global financial crisis, labor migration had moved rapidly to export processing zone set up mostly along the West coast region of the countries. As the result, wage labor and prosperity appeared to increase drastically faster than the interior regions in which agriculture remained to be the dominant means of production and income creation. Here trade liberalization on its own cannot effectively solve social problems created by export-oriented strategy.
Don’t get me wrong. I am not against free trade or market liberalization. I am wholeheartedly against the IMF’s “one size fit all” formula and see the importance of a thorough understanding of country’s historical and political background before any economic policy is prescribed. Market failures are deeply embedded in economic system, which can’t plainly and ignorantly be corrected by Washington’s 10 commandments.
One may then ask: “So, what is the IMF doing these days given our ongoing financial crisis? Has there been a “new” Washington Consensus?” My next entry on this topic will follow.
*Bibliography with attached pdf files on hyperlinks
Deraniyagala, Sonali, and Fine, Ben, “New Trade Theory Versus Old Trade Policy: a Continuing Enigma,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 809-825, November 2001.
Dornbusch, Rudiger, “The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 69-85, 1992.
Ocampo, Jose and Taylor, Lance, “Trade Liberalization in Developing Economies: Modest Benefits but Problems with Productivity Growth, Macro Prices, and Income Distribution,” Economic Journal, Vol. 108, pp.1523-46, September 1998.
Rodrik, Dani, “How to Save Globalization From Its Cheerleaders,” KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-38, September 2007.
Rodrik, Dani, “Rethinking Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2004.
Rodrik, Dani, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4): 973–987, December 2006.
