In China, the 17th National Congress concluded its public deliberations Sunday, and, as shocking as this may seem, the Communist Party is still in control. The week leading up to the 17th National Congress, colleagues kept sending me articles and asking me for my opinion. Frankly, I don't really care what goes on with the National Congress. I'm willing to admit that I don't understand how political power in China is obtained, wielded, or maintained, and I'm willing to bet no one outside of the powers that be in China know how any of that works. I don't even understand how political power in the USA is obtained, wielded, or maintained. It seems that what the public knows is vastly different from how the power structure actually works.
Certainly there are some people who have a better idea of how China's power structure works and they can make better predictions about who will be in power and why, but what's the point? Some people were predicting-- nah, people were HOPING that Hu Jintao would be a political reformer comparable to Mikhail Gorbachev, and they were all disappointed. In fact, "political reform" has been completely dropped from the section heads of Hu's political report, which is the first time that phrase has been left out of the president's report since 1987. An article entitled, Wait a Minute, What Happened to Political Reform, gives a good analysis of Hu's political report:
In this year’s report to the 17th National Congress, Hu Jintao does not place “political reform” in a subhead. Instead, the section dealing with the issue of political reform is called, “Steadfastly Developing Socialist Democratic Politics” (坚定不移发展社会主义民主政治).
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In the section of Hu’s report dealing with political reform, the term itself is not used. The phrase “democratic politics” stands in its stead. Not a big deal, right? This is a tiresome exercise in hair-splitting, right?
Wrong.
In China’s political lexicon, the term “political reform”, or zhengzhi tizhe gaige (政治体制改革), is relatively sensitive. By contrast, “democratic politics” is safe. Searching through a database of mainland newspaper coverage, CMP has found that “democratic politics” has enjoyed a high and steady degree of use over the last several years.
Before 1949 the term “democratic politics” was a weapon the Chinese Communist Party used in its ideological battle with the ruling Kuomintang Party. In the 1980s, Zhao Ziyang said the goal of economic reforms was to create a commodity economy (商品经济), and the goal of political reforms was to build democratic politics. From that point on “democratic politics” became the preferred term used to extol the party’s democratic achievements, such as the national congress and CPPCC systems.
The term “political reform” is unambiguously directed at the problem of abuse of power in China.
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Now, in Hu Jintao’s report, “political reform” is left out of the section heads altogether.
This move should be read as a cold response to growing calls for political reform among intellectuals and the public in China. Hu Jintao is sending a clear message that political reform will not be one of his key agendas.
What does any of that mean for the future of China? I certainly have no idea. How can anyone outside of the inner circles of the Communist Party know the agenda of the Communist Party? It is predicted that Hu is going to retire once this five-year term is up, making this political agenda his legacy. Obviously, he's not hoping to be remembered as a political reformer.
An article I read on Balkinization by Lauren Hilgers talked about the possibility of intra-party democracy:
Intra-party democracy is a sketchy term that has been tossed around Chinese politics for years. In the traditional method of selecting a successor, a candidate is simply handed down from the party's leaders. Intra-party democracy, on the other hand, would see a group of candidates competing and subject to a more transparent vote – determined by the Standing Committee of the Politburo, the entire Politburo or the even the entire congress.
Some see signs that intra-party democracy is on the rise: for example, the party now introduces more candidates than there are posts for party elections (In the politburo this year – 10% more!). Additionally, lack of a clear successor for the presidency may provide an opportunity for this brand of democracy to grow.
Hilgers goes on to point out that even if there are competing factions, those factions could be consolidated within the next five years, eradicating any kind of intra-party democracy the next time the Party meets to determine its leaders for the next five years. Hilgers doesn't say this but her article leaves you with the feeling that when it comes to China's politics, anything is possible.
An article in Forbes simply entitled, Who Rules China?, summarized my thoughts on this subject when it said, "Trying to figure out such inner-party machinations ahead of time has come to resemble the arcane rituals of Soviet-era Kremlinogy, now essentially a high-level form of American high-school gossip[...] But it's fair to say that as long as the Communist Party is in power, there will be only a narrow range within which its leaders can function. Individuals may have their various quirks and abilities, but their policies arise from a cautiously achieved consensus, and often in reaction to whatever crises come to the fore."
Frankly, it's all smoke and mirrors.
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