Transnational Law Blog

Sri Lanka and Trade Policy: Concession or Sanction?

The European Union last week produced an official notice derived from its year-long investigation on human right violation in Sri Lanka. Here are the Commission's final report, and the independent expert's report. Given the Commission's conclusion that Sri Lankan government breached its human rights commitments during it 25-year civil war with the Tamil Tiger, the country is set to  loose its trade concessions, known as GSP Plus, to the European Union, a sanction which will cost the country more than $100m trade benefits. Mr. Rajapaksa’s government has recently secured a $2.6 billion loan from the IMF with very little strings attached despite some delay due to international pressure and warnings of human rights violation in April and May.

From the European Commission:

The Commission has completed a thorough investigation into the human rights situation in Sri Lanka and in particular whether Sri Lanka is living up to the commitments it made to respect international human rights standards when it became a beneficiary of the European Union's GSP+ trade incentive scheme which provides for additional trade benefits.

The report comes to the conclusion that there are significant shortcomings in this area and that Sri Lanka is in breach of its GSP+ commitments.

We will now consult with Member States on whether to prepare a proposal with a view to temporarily suspending these additional trade benefits.

In response to the Commission’s announcement, Financial Times Editorial responded with a legitimate defense for Sri Lanka by emphasizing the inherent purpose of trade preferential treatments, which has been a successful economic instrument to lower many countries’ poverty line.

Sri Lanka is threatened with losing its trade rights because of human rights abuses committed by its government in the course of the conflict with the Tamil Tiger rebels. Such violations are well documented and abhorrent. But it is perverse to punish the clothing industry and other exporters for the actions of security forces they cannot control. In extremis, trade restrictions are a legitimate means to isolate the most vile abusers of human rights, particularly when an authoritarian government controls the entire country and its economy. That is not the case here. Sri Lanka is not Burma.

Using trade as a strategic tool makes the global trading system hostage to endless political posturing and negotiating games. Governments should grant trade preferences on simple, fair criteria, largely based on the poverty and vulnerability of trading partners. Trade deals should be a means for poor countries to haul themselves out of poverty, not a tool of foreign policy manipulation by their richer counterparts. Sri Lanka’s exporters have used their access to the European market well. They should keep it.

 I wrote about my trouble of justifying this civil war as well as concern over human right violations in Sri Lanka early this summer, and thought that leaders of both the Tamil Tiger and Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government should be charged for war crime violations of international humanitarian law including unlawful killings of civilians particularly children and young men as well as forcing child soldiers. However, the removal of GSP Plus to publicly punish Sri Lanka and its people instead of the government, as argued by the Financial Times, seems unjustifiable ex-post. The penalty is estimated to cause more than 2% contraction of Sri Lanka’s troubling economy alone. Separating trade policy from politics and diverging international alliances (Sri Lanka, Iran, China versus other Western countries) is much harder than it sounds. Nevertheless, Sri Lankan workers and exporters should be excluded from international sanction against the country’s military government, while other available legal instrument, i.e. charge for violation of humanitarian right, remains a better tool for the purpose of punishment and deterrence.

*Image by the Economist

The Case Of Ben Bernanke

Last week, most news applauded Obama’s reappointment of Ben Bernanke as the chairman of the Federal Reserve. Of the few commentators who opposed the reappointment, Morgan Stanley Asia's Stephen Roach lists three critical mistakes that Bernanke made leading toward the financial crisis. He argues that Bernanke should not be reappointed because his “pre-crisis actions played an equally critical role in setting the stage for the most wrenching recession since the 1930s.”

First, and foremost, he was deeply wedded to the philosophical conviction that central banks should be agnostic when it comes to asset bubbles. On this count, he stood with his predecessor - serial bubble-blowing Alan Greenspan - who argued that monetary authorities are best positioned to clean up the mess after the bursting of asset bubbles rather than to pre-empt the damage. As a corollary to this approach, both Mr. Bernanke and Mr. Greenspan drew the wrong conclusions from postbubble strategies earlier in this decade put in place after the bursting of the equity bubble in 2000. In retrospect, the Fed's injection of excess liquidity in 2001-2003, which Mr. Bernanke endorsed with fervour, played a key role in setting the stage for the lethal mix of property and credit bubbles.

Second, Mr. Bernanke was the intellectual champion of the "global saving glut" defence that exonerated the US from its bubble-prone tendencies and pinned the blame on surplus savers in Asia. While there is no denying the demand for dollar assets by foreign creditors, it is absurd to blame overseas lenders for reckless behaviour by Americans that a US central bank should have contained. Asia's surplus savers had nothing to do with America's irresponsible penchant for leveraging a housing bubble and using the proceeds to fund consumption. Mr. Bernanke's saving glut argument was at the core of a deep-seated US denial that failed to look in the mirror and pinned blame on others.

Third, Mr. Bernanke is cut from the same market libertarian cloth that got the Fed into this mess. Steeped in the Greenspan credo that markets know better than regulators, Mr. Bernanke was aligned with the prevailing Fed mindset that abrogated its regulatory authority in the era of excess. The derivatives explosion, extreme leverage of regulated and shadow banks and excesses of mortgage lending were all flagrant abuses that both Mr. Bernanke and Mr Greenspan could have said no to. But they did not. As a result, a complex and unstable system veered dangerously out of control.

I thought to myself what would be the risk of not having Bernanke being in charge of the Federal Reserves and whether the outcome would be worse or better given how susceptible investors are to internal changes. The argument that the monetary authorities should not pre-empt the damage of an asset bubble is a valid one. History, including the Great Depression, and Japan’s lost decade, repeatedly demonstrates how monetary tightening in the bull market is damaging to the economy in which speculations are inherently pervasive. Secondly, even if “global saving glut” should not be an excuse for American deteriorating saving accounts during the pre-crisis period, it is, by all means, a true phenomenon, which played a partial role in forming the financial crisis. Asia was not to blame for the crisis; although, the unprecedented accumulation of reserves in foreign currencies inadvertently augmented the US asset price bubble and widened derivative markets. Lastly, it is inescapable that more regulations are knocking on the door notwithstanding if it’s desirable to the Fed’s chairman. I suspect the reforms of banking and financial sectors will take the center stage as health care reform and economic recovery progress. Unless Stephen Roach could point out a better alternative to replace Ben Bernanke, at the moment, the risk appears to supersede the benefit of replacing him.

Trapped in the Middle-Income Class, Malaysia Is Finding Its Way Out

Once considered one of the Asian dragons, foreign investors have largely forgot Malaysia in the decade following the 1998 Asian financial crisis. However, there have been some important recent reforms in business law in Malaysia as the government of Najib Razak finds ways to push its liberalization agenda further in order to attract more foreign capital in the form of market exchange and direct investment.

The most important recent reform has been the relaxation of rules requiring ethnic Malay investors to have at least a 30% stake in any listed company. With the new law “newly listed companies will now be required to make available only a 12.5% stake to ethnic Malay investors without any obligation to achieve the quota if the issue is not taken up by them,” reported the Financial Times. The new regulation arguably aims to ease ethnic tensions and protectionism in favor of Malays of ethnic minorities. The three major ethnic group s include Malays (51%), Chinese (24%) and Indians (7%).

 In addition, the government also took a significant step by changing the restriction on the former foreign ownership ceiling for asset management funds and brokerages. According to the Financial Times, “under the new rules, ‘qualified and leading’ foreign fund management companies in the wholesale segment will be allowed to set up operations in Malaysia without need of a local equity partner, while the foreign shareholding limit for unit trusts in the retail sector will be raised to 70 per cent from 49 per cent. Similar change also applied to foreign ownership ceiling for brokerages.

Back in the early 1970s, while implementing various policies in order to attract foreign investors, particularly those that could bring in technological development, the Abdul Rayak government imposed legislation to the effect that Malays (the major ruling ethnic group) must own 30% of most local companies. This discriminatory condition, defended four decades ago as “a genuine assault on poverty”, eventually helped embed a system of privileges for well-connected insiders and widened the political gap between the government and various business groups to the extent that various policies can no longer be effectively implemented.

Like Thailand, Malaysia has absorbed manufacturing FDI for many decades. However, during the last decade, the rise of China, the impact of the Asian financial crisis and progress in regional and global integration have forced the country into a new developmental phase. Aside from attracting more foreign investment, improving domestic capacity has become the cornerstone for continuing the development of Malaysia; however, such “leveling up” efforts have for the most part been “excruciatingly slow”, if not entirely unsuccessful.

The steps taken by the Malaysian government in recent months have arguably come “more than a decade too late”. Nonetheless, foreign investors remain cautiously optimistic. The reforms in question are, by their nature, long-term; as such, eventual evidence of success will hopefully tempt investors to return to the country: “The Malaysian market was in danger of slipping off the edge of investors’ radar screens. Now it has the potential of becoming more important again,” said the Financial Times.

My impression is that external threats such as the rise of China, the Asian financial crisis or the global integration of the Asia Pacific region can only take partial responsibility for Malaysia’s economic standing. It is probable that the bigger and less apparent problem lies in the fragmentation of the political and social ties between the central government and various  interest groups causing failures to enforce or implement policy in recent years. For example, in the Malaysian government’s Second Industrial Master Plan (“IMP2”) of 1996-2005, the concept of “manufacturing plus plus”  correctly sets out,  what a middle-income country such as Malaysia should do in order to advance to the next stage of development. Yet Malaysia largely did not succeed in meeting its own goals during the implementation period of IMP2. Whatever the cause of the social and political fragmentation, it was not substantial enough to slow down the growth process in the decades prior to the Asian financial crisis; and yet for some reason, it appears that the crisis was a turning point after which the internal problems of Malaysia began to hinder further development. Consequently, any reform effort under the title of “liberalization” must offer adequate attention to the internal conflicts of the country, or else the dragon may continue to slumber.

As the Dong Falls, Vietnam Faces a Harder Test at the Time of Global Crisis

The Financial Times recently reported that the Vietnam's dong is depreciating steadily as budget deficit and account imbalance grows with "chronic current account deficit that reached $8.4bn, or 9.3 per cent of gross domestic product, in 2008". Vietnamese government is facing the threat of not gathering enough money for its $80bn fiscal stimulus package as bonds and other commercial tools are falling flat. Investors are holding onto foreign currency due to the uncertainty of the dongs mostly credits to growing trade imbalances and insufficient foreign reserves.

This is a predictable test that most developing countries face at this stage of development, and is what economists considered as the "original sin," for which domestic currency is not used for foreign loans and on long term domestic loan contracts. Reliance on foreign currency for domestic exchange and long term loans make the country highly vulnerable to exchange shock and speculative attack which were the major drivers of the 97-98 Asian financial crisis. The Vietnamese government has little choice, and each option carries relative cost. Raising more reserves will temporary slow down growth, but this must to be done to boost investor's confidence on domestic market and to provide a stable macro economic framework for further development. Vietnamese government must find the outlet to do this- better now than later.

China's Rising Power and the Hope for a Multi-Polar World

Recently David Pilling of the Financial Times published a thought-provoking article under the title: “Asia Pays Tribute to Its New Superpower,” which discusses how the rise of China during the time of economic crisis has been perceived within the region and beyond. I found the true nature of this article troubling. David Pilling said it right: there is a sense of “trepidation at the rise of China’s power.” Such idea fuels much of my thoughts the past couple of days. Pilling opened his article by a contemplation of a potential multi-polar world.

There has been much chatter about the “G2” lately. But the idea that the US and China can together, and semi-exclusively, take on the world’s biggest problems is overdone. That day may come. For the moment, though, there are limits to how much an authoritarian government presiding over a relatively poor country can contribute to global problem-solving. For now, the rise of China and the relative decline of the US are more likely to mean a multi-polar than a bipolar world.

The article lists some indicative examples to demonstrate how the world has changed its grasp diplomatically toward China. By owning roughly $1,400bn of the U.S. asset, Chinese government had quieted Hillary Clinton on issue related to human rights, Taiwan and Tibet during her visit early this year. During the G20 gathering in London, France’s president, Nicolas Sarkozy, expressed his withdrawal from supporting Tibetan independence. Smaller countries have provided greater service. Vietnam’s prime minister, Nguyen Tan Dung recently spent one week touring China in anxious mode to close the $11 billion trade gap between the two countries. The South Korean warning of the “Beijing Consensus” reported to leave its Korean diplomats in Beijing apprehensive. What’s more? Taiwan is likely to allow China’s Mobile to purchase 12 percent of the Far East Tone, a Taiwanese mobile operator. Such commitment arguably was arranged to earn Beijing’s agreement toward the Taiwanese’s presence at the WHO’s annual meeting. In just a few days, the news was sufficient to boost Taiwanese stock market up nearly 15%  after Beijing announced its consent. 

I sometimes wonder how the political and economic landscape of the world be transformed if China grows to be the second largest economy in the world taking over Japan and the European Union. That day may not be postponed that much further. Nonetheless, despite an impressive rapid growth in the past two decades, at $7,600 per capita, China’s per capita GDP still ranks 107th in the world. The country itself is also facing various internal problems namely food and resource shortage, raising unemployment, social and regional marginalization, as well as a degrading environment that together raise serious question of Chinese economic sustainability. There are much awaiting this nation in the post-crisis period to resolve its internal issue. For now, the idea of a multi-polar world offers me much greater comfort.

 

*Nations with highest GDP (in 2006, trillions of U.S. dollars), figure taken from the Hoover Institue.

Reaching Out to Sri Lanka

I have been regularly following up with the news from Sri Lanka. Images and news from this civil war brought me solemn concern and uneasiness. Here in London, I caught this scene one weekend early this month. A sense of helplessness arrived soon after I stepped deep into the scene seeing men, children, elders and women yelling out loud their urging need and asking for international intervention. They were right, Sri Lanka is facing a humantarian criris; although, the Tigers themselves also committed the type of war crime that they are pledging against Sri Lankan government. There can never be a right reason for war and violence. Yet, at times people involved seem to put on a convincing case with the Tamil Tiger for their own justice (or injustice).

Last Thursday, Sri Lanka's President, Mahinda Rajapaksa, rejected advice from European high-level delegations to proceed a temporary ceasefire and told the representatives to stop lecturing him.

 “The government is not ready to enter into any kind of cease-fire with the terrorists. It is my duty to protect the people of this country. I don’t need lectures from Western representatives,” said the President in a speech distributed by his office, the New York Times reports.

According to the United Nation, 6,500 civilian have died and twice have been wounded since late January. At the moment, there are still 50,000 civilians are trapped in the combat zone with very little humanitarian supports. The refuge camps are reported to be "overcrowding, malnourishment, dehydration and limited medical facilities." Despite growing tension with foreign governments, the Sri Lanka government has been unwilling to openly allow international support-groups to enter further into the war zone.

Last March, Sri Lanka reported its slowest economic growth rate in five years last year, at 6% underlining the need for the government to push ahead with talks on a bail-out from the International Monetary Fund. However, due to the government's resistance, the United States had decided to delay a $1.9 billion International Monetary Fund bailout for Sri Lanka’s central bank to pressure the government to do more to help trapped civilians.

Such intervention seems to do little to change the Sri Lankan government's attitude toward cooperation and helping displaced civilians from boths ethinic groups. International governments and agencies must continue to pressure Mahinda Rajapaksa's government to allow international humanitarian groups to rescue and provide basic aids to the war victims.

Over the Worst Yet, Japan?

We don't know for sure, but at least Japan is showing signs of stabilization. Despite growing deflation and addition contraction at 3.3% this year, the Financial Times today reported some stabilizing signs from the second largest economy in the world giving hope that the worst of the recession may be almost over.

So far, industrial production in March rose at twice the expected pace, climbing 1.6 percent month-on-month. In addition, factory output rose for the first time in six months. The Royal Bank of Scotland in Tokyo also reported: "factory production appears to be getting close to the bottom." That was March, industrial production is expected to continue rising further this month, as well as May due to manufacturers trying to make up for their previous inventory reductions.

Japan predicted stabilization sheds lights and a glimpse of hope for the Asia Pacific region; even though, recovery is probably still far from the horizon. Toyota is expecting its "worst slump in memory" (for almost six decades) and Normura recently revealed a record of $7.2bn net loss. Earlier this week, the Japanese government announced additional issuance of $175 in bonds as tax revenue shortfalls is becoming inescapable this coming fiscal year. However, it remains unclear if the central bank will strike for any further recovering measures. It is keeping overnight lending rate at 0.1 per cent at the moment.

We can't expect good news on global recovery just yet, but stabilization is a real good sign regardless.

Rethinking the Washington Consensus on Trade Liberalization

"‘Stabilize, privatize, and liberalize’ became the mantra of a generation of technocrats who cut their teeth in the developing world and of the political leaders they counseled"- Dani Rodrik, Professor of International Political Economy, Harvard University

Across legal and economic disciplines, there have been many arguments regarding the benefits of free trade on developing countries. At the heart of such discussion is the controversial result of the Washington Consensus “describe[ed] a set of ten specific economic policy prescriptions that … constitute a "standard" reform package promoted for crisis-wracked developing countries by Washington D.C based institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank and the U.S. Treasury Department.” (Wikipedia).  According to Dani Rodrik (2006) the ten commandments of Washington consensus were:

1. Fiscal discipline
2. Reorientation of public expenditures
3. Tax reform
4. Financial liberalization
5. Unified and competitive exchange rates
6. Trade liberalization
7. Openness to FDI
8. Privatization
9. Deregulation
10.Secure Property Rights

In an assessment of the literature on the theory and empirical research relating to the benefits of trade liberalization, Deraniyagala and Fine (2001) found that much of the works were flawed, and concluded that the extent to which free trade benefits economic development is unknown. As the result, the past three decades since 1980s found many political economists arguing for a better approach toward trade liberalization in order to minimize its negative impacts of economic backwardness as in the case of Latin American or income distribution and regional polarization as the case of China.

Mexico is an example of a failed economy that followed the conventional wisdom of trade liberalization rigidly. Here, we find that more than one lesson could be learned. The country started its economic reform in 1985. Under tremendous pressure from the U.S. and the IMF, Mexico radically opened up its economy to the world market without sufficient institutional reform to accommodate the economic adjustment. “Import penetration increase from an average of 11.3 percent in 1080-85 to 14.5 in 1986-90. By 1990, import penetration had already reached 17 percent.” (Dornbusch, 1992). The sharp rise in imports, which was not accompanied by immediate gain in exports and foreign direct investments damaged Mexico’s domestic market and defy many infant industries. (Dornbusch, 1992). It is argued that Mexico, as well as Latin America as a whole, did worse than its pre-1980s period, when import substitution, protectionism and macroeconomics populism were enforced. (Rodrik 2007). As Rodrik asserts: “That the region did better with these discredited policies than it has been under open-market policies is a fact that is quite hard to digest within the conventional paradigm.” Such paradox reinforces the importance of a new approach to trade liberalization where country’s institutional and historical background are all too significant to be ignored and total trade liberalization alone may not generate the growth that its creator promised. Here, the role of the government and some forms of targeted protectionism at the beginning of the reform may be useful. South Korea and China offered excellent case studies for its usage of the new trade theory to their economic benefits.

Korea did not play by the orthodox wisdom (nor it has ever accepted the Washington Consensus to be therapeutic during the Asian crisis) when it started to integrate into the world economy. In contrast, the country successful economic reform involves two major key strategies- market orientation coupled with central planning in developing and protecting infant industries while strategically opened up other industries to the world market. During the reform, Korean government, indeed, acted as an entrepreneur to induce desirable private investments toward targeted industries. Korean trade liberalization, therefore, was a selective process instead of being driven solely by global marketization. Many major sectors were deliberately protected and excluded from trade. By using selective export strategy and heavy government intervention, Korea was able to develop many highly competitive manufacturing industries such as automobile, electrical appliances and shipping which respectively hold their own names in the world market.

China started its reform by first rejecting the conventional wisdom of global liberalization and calling its reform “Socialism with Chinese Characteristic.”  Unlike Latin America, Chinese government moved cautiously from central planning to gradual adoption of institutional and mechanism of market economy. Rodrik (2004) argues that China reformed its incentives in a “two-track manner” by grafting a market system on top of a central-planned system, rather than abandoning the latter altogether. The country also underplayed private property rights and relied instead on township-and-village enterprises owned by local governments as well as opened up to the world partially by establishing special economic zones. (Rodrik, 2004). Without following the Washington consensus blindly, the result of Chinese economic progress has been impressive. China’s GDP performance has been consistently stayed at 8-10% growth rate in the past 20 years. Here, China’s success challenged the conventional wisdom total trade liberalization and market orientation.

Despite how countries have been benefiting from trade, there exist multiple issues created by export growth strategy itself such as income inequality and regional polarization. According to Ocampo and Taylor (1998), globalization has intensified the income gap and income distribution especially in countries with comparative advantage in skill-intensive products. The authors offer examples of African economies whose comparative advantage in peasant production has worsened income distribution. Similarly, despite China’s conservative approach toward trade liberalization in accordance with government intervention, the country has been facing serious issues regarding income inequality and regional polarization. Prior to the eruption of the global financial crisis, labor migration had moved rapidly to export processing zone set up mostly along the West coast region of the countries. As the result, wage labor and prosperity appeared to increase drastically faster than the interior regions in which agriculture remained to be the dominant means of production and income creation. Here trade liberalization on its own cannot effectively solve social problems created by export-oriented strategy.

Don’t get me wrong. I am not against free trade or market liberalization. I am wholeheartedly against the IMF’s “one size fit all” formula and see the importance of a thorough understanding of country’s historical and political background before any economic policy is prescribed. Market failures are deeply embedded in economic system, which can’t plainly and ignorantly be corrected by Washington’s 10 commandments.

One may then ask: “So, what is the IMF doing these days given our ongoing financial crisis? Has there been a “new” Washington Consensus?” My next entry on this topic will follow.

*Bibliography with attached pdf files on hyperlinks

Deraniyagala, Sonali, and Fine, Ben, “New Trade Theory Versus Old Trade Policy: a Continuing Enigma,” Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 25, pp. 809-825, November 2001.

Dornbusch, Rudiger, “The Case for Trade Liberalization in Developing Countries,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 6, issue 1, pp. 69-85, 1992.

Ocampo, Jose and Taylor, Lance, “Trade Liberalization in Developing Economies: Modest Benefits but Problems with Productivity Growth, Macro Prices, and Income Distribution,” Economic Journal, Vol. 108, pp.1523-46, September 1998.

Rodrik, Dani, “How to Save Globalization From Its Cheerleaders,” KSG Working Paper No. RWP07-38, September 2007.

Rodrik, Dani, “Rethinking Economic Growth in Developing Countries,” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2004.

Rodrik, Dani, "Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review of the World Bank's Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, 44(4): 973–987, December 2006.

Saving the Dragon

In the process of learning about China’s economic development, I often wonder if it was the right policy for China to cut its domestic spending on public services to suppress its currency while exporting most of its capital surplus to the West. Even in pure economic term, shouldn't economic growth equivalent with improvement of social welfare and income distribution? The answer is obvious- there is no promise of such upgrading even in an economy that has been growing at a rapid rate like China. After the Asian financial crisis in the late 90s, the Chinese government together with the rest of the Asia Pacific decided to protect its economy by maintaining a huge amount of reserves in foreign currency and bonds which ended up injecting an enormous capital inflows toward the US and Europe market causing an unprecedented equity bubbles. Ironically, together they became the partial cause of the current global financial crisis.

Last Thursday, Premier Wen Jiabao announced that China expects to meet it goal of 8% growth rate this year despite their declining economic performance. What did he have in mind to secure such ambitious growth rate?

To supplement for the fast decline in exports, the government has allocated $585bn (almost equivalent to 3% GDP) toward domestic spending and investment for the next 2 years. A big portion of this stimulus package will be spent on improving China deteriorating infrastructure especially on the national railway network. “Many economists believe such heavy infrastructure investment will delay the much-needed shift in China’s growth model towards domestic consumption and services, which would be more sustainable in both economic and environmental terms,” said Geoff Dyer of the Financial Times. I have some disagreements with this opinion.

While improving infrastructure will not give Chinese economy a quick boost in domestic consumption, it is of crucial advantage for China long-term growth. On one hand, the plan will enhance long-term development and improvement in the public service by providing transporting access to the remote regions of the country. Investment in heavy infrastructure will also lay a firm foundation to boost domestic consumption in the long term once local economy picks up. Next, improved infrastructure could further attract more foreign direct investment into the interior regions of the country where labor is still abundantly cheap. This will in turn further help to bridge the gap of regional and social differentiation rooted deeply in China's experimenting economic strategy.

Besides, the stimulus bill doesn’t disregard the need to stimulate domestic consumption all together. Some parts of the $585bn are expected to add an additional 24% to education, 38% to health care and 171% in investment for low-income housing this year.

With increasing lay offs from the country’s export processing zones, slumping economy and the tradition of holding high saving rate, it is challenging for the Chinese government to boost domestic consumption in a short term. By allocating money to infrastructure, the government will at least mitigate a portion of workers to construction industry and offset some parts of the growing unemployed labor force. More importantly, improvements of infrastructure and public services are particularly vital for China’s sustainable and long-term development. With much criticism, a part of this stimulus plan appears to hold credible value.

*Image from the Financial Times

A Capitalist Crisis?

Having born and brought up in a communist country as well as reading Marxism over the years in both social and economic disciplines, I can’t help asking myself the question: “How would Marx respond to this financial crisis?” The question lingered for weeks. Yesterday, I finally did a quick search on this subject. Unsurprisingly, there has been a revival of interest in Marx ever since the crisis started. Das Kapital, one of Marx’s most known analyses on the economy of capitalism have once again become the best seller all over the world. Last year, Phillip Collins of the UK Times published an article under “Karl Marx: did he get it all right?”. After a quick scan through Marx’s Ten Steps to Communism, the author gave Marx 3.5 over 10 for his assumed prophetic ability in predicting our financial crisis. Collin stated the obvious: Mark was right about the nature of crisis embodied in capitalism, but not much more.

I found the article a fun read with good review of Marxism, as well as was amused with Collins' British sense of humor. But it did not satisfy my curiosity. What is more? What do our American Marxists think about this issue? Robert Brenner, a Marxist and economic historian of UCLA, seems to offer a solid yet provocative perspective through his interview with Seoul’s economist, Jeong Seong-ji titled "A Way out of the Global Economic Crisis?"

Back in December 2007, Brenner was almost prophetic about the upcoming financial crisis while at least half of the world was still relatively optimistic about economic downturn. By late December 2008, Brenner once again stressed that the crisis is much more substantial than most people expected.

According to the Marxian professor: “The basic source of today’s crisis is the declining vitality of the advanced economies since 1973, and, especially, since 2000.” Brenner contends that capitalists solved the problem of slowing capital accumulation by calling forth to the ever greater levels of borrowing to sustain stability. Thus, our economic system requires the crisis that has so long been postponed since “it’s by way of crisis that, historically, capitalism has restored the rate of profit and established the necessary conditions for more dynamic capital accumulations” said the Marxian historian.

The interview covers controversy issues such as the role of the US’s hegemony in maintaining the world order, Keynes monetary policies as a solution for the crisis, the depth of the Chinese crisis and its role in financing the our debts over the past decades.

In addition, the professor also made a comparison between Obama’s future performance as with Roosevelt’s and how our country can only change the system under a class struggle namely revolving pressure from the workers and unions. He asserts: “like Roosevelt, Obama can be expected to take decisive action in defense of working people only if he is pushed by way of organized direct action from below.”

In responding to Jeong’s question on Korea, Brenner maintains that as deep and troublesome the Chinese crisis is revealing, China may be able to contain the crisis better than Korea due to its low-cost labor force and large domestic consumption. This is due to both Korea and China reliance on globalization for their growth, which turn out to be a weakness at the moment. “It’s not necessarily because Korea is doing the wrong thing,” the author continues, “it’s because I don’t think there’s going to be an easy way out for any part of what has become a truly global, interdependent capitalist system.”

For Brenner, the only way for countries to reestablish healthy capitalism appropriate for growth and further capital accumulation is through strengthening the movement of labor organization. The class struggle promises to balance the distribution of power necessary for readjustment.

“So, again, the top priority for progressives -- for any left activists -- where they should be active is in trying to revive the organizations of working people. Without the re-creation of working class power, little progress will be possible, and the only way to recreate that power is by way of mobilization for direct action. Only through working people taking action, collectively and en masse, will they be able to create the organization and amass the power necessary to provide the social basis, so to speak, for a transformation of their own consciousness, for political radicalization.”

I wonder if one could find a more Marxian solution to our financial crisis than what Brenner contends. On the other hand, this approach has never been so out of reach given the current feeble and fragmented state of our labor unions and the worker’s strength in taking the action necessary to protect their long-term interest.

Robert P. Brenner and Jeong Seong-jin. Photo provided by The Hankyoreh
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Below are a few additional quotes that I also found particularly thought-provoking.

Disputing Keynes monetary policy in effectively changing the landscape of our crisis
"But there is reason to doubt that Keynesianism, in the sense of huge government deficits and easy credit to pump up demand, can have the impact that many expect. After all, during the past seven years, thanks to the borrowing and spending encouraged by the Federal Reserve’s housing bubble and the Bush administration’s budget deficits, we witnessed what was, in effect, probably the greatest Keynesian economic stimulus in peacetime history. Yet we got the weakest business cycle in the postwar epoch."

China and East Asia as the US’s largest creditors
"To have a significant effect on the economy, the Obama administration will likely have to contemplate a huge wave of direct or indirect government investment, in effect a form of state capitalism. To actually accomplish this, however, would require overcoming enormous political and economic obstacles. The U.S. political culture is enormously hostile to state enterprise. At the same time, the level of expenditure and state indebtedness that would be required could threaten the dollar. Until now, East Asian governments have been happy to fund U.S. external and government deficits, in order to sustain U.S. consumption and their own exports. But, with the crisis overtaking even China, these governments may lose the capacity to finance U.S. deficits, especially as they grow to unprecedented size. The truly terrifying prospect of a run on the dollar looms in the background."

The US hegemonic role in maintaining the world order
"I see the elites of the world, especially the elites of the capitalist core, broadly conceived as being very happy with U.S. hegemony, because what it means for them is that the U.S. assumes the role and the cost of world policeman."

Future possibility for the working class to influence our political environment
"The problem is that there is very little organization of working people, let alone any political expression. So, one can say there is this very big opportunity created by the change in the political environment, or the ideological climate, but that by itself is not going to provide a progressive outcome."

Following note: Just as Brenner stresses the capitalist exploitation of labor and social resources as well as insists on  importance of worker's union in order to improve our political and economic landscape. Look at what have just happened here (pdf).